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Spotting the intentions of a pickpocket in a crowded environment may save a few dollars. If
you are a police officer, then identifying a suspect who is pretending to reach for a wallet while
actually pulling a gun can be a matter of life or death. These examples illustrate that detecting
deceptive intentions from other persons’ actions is of great practical importance in many social
contexts. Although it is well known that humans can identify deceptive intentions based on bodily
cues, our understanding of deception detection, however, is still quite limited, partly because a
comprehensive theoretical framework of deception detection is lacking. This is different for pro-
social human interactions like playing a piano duet. In this context, overarching and unifying
explanations are available based on the concept of embodied simulation. Here I propose that
embodied simulation is perhaps the most promising steppingstone to develop a comprehensive
embodied theory of deception detection as well. Embodied simulation is typically construed as
the interplay between action and perception and it also incorporates the interplay with cognition
and emotion. In my view, integrating and studying motor, perceptual, cognitive and emotional
processes is imperative to understand how deceptive intentions can be detected from human
movements. This opinion paper aims at fleshing out this idea and providing some first suggestions
and hypotheses on how to achieve the ultimate goal to develop an encompassing embodied theory
of deception detection in (anti)social interactions.
To start with, deception can be defined as an act that aims to mislead an observer into making
an incorrect judgment about the actor’s (i.e., deceiver’s) true action intention (Cañal-Bruland and
Schmidt, 2009). To date most research on deception has been dedicated to detecting deceit in verbal
communication (i.e., lying) (e.g., Bond et al., 1992; Frank and Ekman, 1997; Ekman et al., 1999);
less research has been devoted to non-verbal cues in catching liars (e.g., Ekman and Friesen, 1969;
Vrij, 2004, 2006); and, despite its obvious relevance, remarkably little research has been done to
better understand the detection of deceptive intentions embodied in movements (e.g., Runeson
and Frykholm, 1983; Cañal-Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009).
Since the pioneering work by Runeson and Frykholm (1983) it is commonly accepted that
observers can distinguish between deceptive and non-deceptive intentions based on bodily cues.
Their original study revealed that information conveyed by joint kinematics alone was not only
sufficient to accurately judge the weight of a carried box but also to recognize whether the actor
carrying the box intended to mislead the observer about the true weight of the box. Yet, despite
Runeson and Frykholm’s important finding, as well as recent work exploring expertise effects and
neuronal mechanisms contributing to successful deception detection from bodily actions (e.g.,
Kunde et al., 2011; Brault et al., 2012; Tomeo et al., 2012; Mori and Shimada, 2013; Wright et al.,
2013; Renden et al., 2014; Wright and Jackson, 2014), the underlying psychological processes that
allow human observers to successfully recognize deceptive intentions from others’ bodily actions
remain largely unknown.
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To unravel the psychological processes that allow human
observers to successfully recognize deceptive actions from others’
bodily actions, it is of paramount importance to develop and
establish an encompassing theoretical framework to study and
explain deception detection. A novel theoretical backdrop is
necessary because in contrast to the study of pro-social human
interactions (including joint actions such as playing a piano
duet, see Sebanz et al., 2006), there is a definite need for
such a theoretical framework to account for antisocial human
interactions, in which human agents attempt to mislead and
potentially harm others. This is particularly true for the field of
deception detection.
Here it is proposed that the most promising way to develop
a theory for deception detection is to start from recent theories
of embodiment that have proven successful in explaining pro-
social human interactions by focusing on the tight links between
perception and action such as the common coding theory (Prinz,
1997; Hommel et al., 2001; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
These theories are groundbreaking in that they break away from
the Cartesian view that perception and action constitute distinct
entities. On the contrary, they argue that perceptual processes are
grounded in the motor system in a way that action capabilities
and intentions shape what we see and how we interpret what we
see.
However, these ideas need be extended in order to establish
an embodied theory of deception detection, because next to
perceptual and motor influences on deception detection, other
psychological processes may also contribute to antisocial human
interactions such as cognitions (e.g., thoughts) and emotions
(e.g., empathic feelings). Hence, I suggest to supplement existing
perception-action theories with findings from social cognitive
neuroscience pointing at the links between perception and action
representations with cognitions and emotions (Gallese, 2001,
2003; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009). Key assumption of this idea is
that the ability underlying the successful detection of deceptive
action intentions in others’ movements is rooted in embodied
simulation (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007). Embodied simulation
enables observers to (implicitly) activate their own internal
representations of bodily states associated with the observed
actions, emotions and cognitions (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007).
I suggest that a deeper understanding of antisocial human
interactions such as in deception detection can only be gained
if we integrate not only the mapping of motor and perceptual
representations, but also include the interplay between internal
representations of bodily states with cognitions and emotions.
The concept of embodied simulation can unify motor,
perceptual, cognitive and emotional processes into one
integrative framework that has the potential to develop
into a novel, comprehensive embodied theoretical framework for
the exploration of deception detection (see Figure 1).
How can one test the assumptions and implications of
this view? To start with, common-coding theory argues
that the perception and production of (deceptive and non-
deceptive) actions share common representations (Prinz, 1997;
Hommel et al., 2001; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007).
Because perception and action are deemed tightly coupled
by common representations, they can mutually induce each
FIGURE 1 | An embodied theoretical framework for the exploration of
deception detection.
other. This reciprocal influence has been substantiated by
neurophysiological studies that identified brain networks that
respond to the observation as well as the production of an action
(Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). It
follows that a high similarity between perceptual and motor
representations promotes action perception. That is, observers
are predicted to be perceptually better attuned to observed
movements that form part of one’s own motor repertoire,
typically acquired through personal action experience (Schütz-
Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). In other words, the more action
experience an observer has accumulated with executing a specific
movement, the better the perception of the same movement
should be when executed by another person (referred to as the
“motor experience hypothesis,” Cañal-Bruland et al., 2010). This
contention has received empirical support from both behavioral
studies (Knoblich and Flach, 2001; Loula et al., 2005; Casile and
Giese, 2006; Cañal-Bruland et al., 2011, 2012) and brain imaging
recordings (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006).
There is initial evidence that this hypothesis also holds true
for deception detection. Sebanz and Shiffrar (2009) reported that
expert basketball players outperformed novices in identifying
fake pass movements when presented with short video clips
but not with static images (see also Jackson et al., 2006; Cañal-
Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Cañal-Bruland et al., 2010). They
also showed that experts maintained their superior performance
when presented with point-light-animations (only displaying
kinematic landmarks), while novices did not perform better than
chance (see also Williams et al., 2009). These results indicate that
the motor repertoire of an observer indeed plays a crucial role in
deception detection.
As depicted in Figure 1, detecting deception from bodily cues
by means of embodied simulation is not exclusively confined to
the fundamental links between perception and action but also
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includes the inference of cognitive and emotional states. There
is initial evidence for such interactions showing that knowledge
about the likelihood of deceptive actions biases judgments about
whether an observed movement may be deceptive or not (Cañal-
Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; see also Wright et al., 2013; Mann
et al., 2014).
Movements convey critical information (Johansson, 1973,
1976; for a review, see Blake and Shiffrar, 2007) that allow
human observers to discriminate subtle movement differences
(Cutting et al., 1978; Runeson and Frykholm, 1983; Bertenthal
et al., 1985). A seminal experimental approach is to present
participants with a subset of anatomical landmarks representing
different joint centers of an actor as moving points of
light, called point-light displays (PLDs; see Cañal-Bruland
and Williams, 2010). Of particular relevance for embodied
simulation is that based on such PLDs humans are able to
recognize one’s own identity (Beardsworth and Buckner, 1981;
Jokisch et al., 2006), the identity of friends (Cutting and
Kozlowski, 1977), gender (Pollick et al., 2005), and also to
predict action intentions and movement effects (Abernethy
et al., 2001; Huys et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2009), including
the detection of deceptive action intentions (Runeson and
Frykholm, 1983; Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009). Perhaps even
more relevant for the embodied simulation argument is that
based on kinematics alone human observers can also accurately
identify emotions like happiness and sadness (Dittrich et al.,
1996; Atkinson et al., 2004) or discern expression intensities
in dance movements (Sevdalis and Keller, 2012). Intriguingly,
in a recent study by Sevdalis and Keller (2012) judgment
accuracy was positively correlated with self-reported empathy
indices. This underscores the role of emotions such as empathic
feelings for judgments of observed movements and links
directly to the convincing evidence that embodied simulation
also accounts for how humans empathize with each other
(Gallese, 2001; Gallese et al., 2004; de Vignemont and Singer,
2006).
To summarize, because (a) movements convey critical
information for action recognition and the inference of cognitive
and emotional states of human agents, and because (b) human
observers are able to identify action intentions as well as cognitive
and emotional states from others’ bodily actions by means of
embodied simulation, it seems imperative to explore the joint
contributions of perceptual, motor, cognitive and emotional
processes to deception detection, with the aim to develop an
integrative embodied theory of deception detection. A promising
way to do so is based on the following observation: if cognitions
and emotions influence perception-action-informed judgments
about deceptive action intentions, there are essentially two
possible ways in which this could be effectuated: (1) either
cognitions and emotions influence the perceptual sensitivity
directly, which then eventually leads to different judgments, or
(2) cognitions and emotions change, that is, shift the judgment
criterion (independent of the perceptual sensitivity), thereby
causing a judgment bias. Based on some preliminary findings
from my own lab (Cañal-Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Cañal-
Bruland et al., 2015), I consider the latter more likely than the
former. That is, I hypothesize that cognitions as well as emotions
bias the judgments about rather than perception of deceptive
actions. However, future research is needed to scrutinize these
ideas and thereby improve our understanding of deception
detection in action.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
approved it for publication.
REFERENCES
Abernethy, B., Gill, D. P., Parks, S. L., and Packer, S. T. (2001). Expertise and the
perception of kinematic and situational probability information. Perception 30,
233–252. doi: 10.1068/p2872
Atkinson, A. P., Dittrich, W. H., Gemmell, A. J., and Young, A. W. (2004).
Emotion perception from dynamic and static body expressions in point-light
and full-light displays. Perception 33, 717–746. doi: 10.1068/p5096
Beardsworth, T., and Buckner, T. (1981). The ability to recognize oneself from a
video recording of one’s movement without one’s body. Bull. Psychon. Soc. 18,
19–22. doi: 10.3758/BF03333558
Bertenthal, B. I., Proffitt, D. R., Spetner, N. B., and Thomas, M. A. (1985). The
development of infant’s sensitivity to biomechanical displays. Child Dev. 56,
531–543. doi: 10.2307/1129742
Blake, R., and Shiffrar,M. (2007). Perception of humanmotion.Annu. Rev. Psychol.
58, 47–73. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190152
Bond, C. F. Jr., Omar, A., Pitre, U., Lashley, B. R., Skaggs, L. M., and Kirk, C. T.
(1992). Fishy-looking liars: deception judgment from expectancy violation. J.
Pers. Soc. Psychol. 63, 969–977. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.969
Brault, S., Bideau, B., Kulpa, R., and Craig, C. M. (2012). Detecting deception
in movement: the case of the side-step in rugby. PLoS ONE 7:e37494.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0037494
Calvo-Merino, B., Glaser, D. E., Grèzes, J., Passingham, R. E., and Haggard, P.
(2005). Action observation and acquired motor skills: an fMRI study with
expert dancers. Cereb. Cortex 15, 1243–1249. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhi007
Calvo-Merino, B., Grèzes, J., Glaser, D. E., Passingham, R. E., and Haggard, P.
(2006). Seeing or doing? Influence of visual and motor familiarity in action
observation. Curr. Biol. 16, 1905–1910. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2006.07.065
Cañal-Bruland, R., Balch, L., and Niesert, L. (2015). Judgement bias in predicting
the success of one’s own basketball free throws but not those of others. Psychol.
Res. 79, 548–555. doi: 10.1007/s00426-014-0592-2
Cañal-Bruland, R., Kreinbucher, C., and Oudejans, R. R. D. (2012). Motor
experience influences ball and strike judgments in baseball. Int. J. Sport Psychol.
43, 137–152.
Cañal-Bruland, R., Mooren, M., and Savelsbergh, G. J. (2011). Differentiating
experts’ anticipatory skills in beach volleyball. Res. Q. Exerc. Sport 82, 667–674.
doi: 10.1080/02701367.2011.10599803
Cañal-Bruland, R., and Schmidt, M. (2009). Response bias in judging
deceptive movements. Acta Psychol. (Amst). 130, 235–240. doi: 10.1016/
j.actpsy.2008.12.009
Cañal-Bruland, R., van der Kamp, J., and van Kesteren, J. (2010).
An examination of motor and perceptual contributions to
recognizing deception in others’ actions. Hum. Mov. Sci. 29,
94–102. doi: 10.1016/j.humov.2009.10.001
Cañal-Bruland, R., and Williams, A. M. (2010). Recognizing and predicting
movement effects: identifying critical movement features. Exp. Psychol. 57,
320–326. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000038
Casile, A., and Giese, M. A. (2006). Non-visual motor learning
influences the recognition of biological motion. Curr. Biol. 16, 69–74.
doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2005.10.071
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 166
Cañal-Bruland Deception Detection in Action
Cutting, J. E., and Kozlowski, L. T. (1977). Recognizing friends by their walk:
gait perception without familiarity cues. Bull. Psychon. Soc. 9, 353–356.
doi: 10.3758/BF03337021
Cutting, J. E., Proffitt, D. R., and Kozlowski, L. T. (1978). A biomechanical
invariant for gait perception. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percep. Perform. 4, 357–372.
doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.4.3.357
de Vignemont, F., and Singer, T. (2006). The emphatic brain: how, when, and why?
Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 435–441. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.008
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., and Rizzolatti, G. (1992).
Understanding motor events: a neuropsychological study. Exp. Brain Res. 91,
176–180. doi: 10.1007/BF00230027
Dittrich, W. H., Troscianko, T., Lea, S. E., and Morgan, D. (1996). Perception of
emotion from dynamic point-light displays represented in dance. Perception
25, 727–738. doi: 10.1068/p250727
Ekman, P., and Friesen, W. V. (1969). Non-verbal leakage and clues to deception.
Psychiatry 32, 88–105. doi: 10.1080/00332747.1969.11023575
Ekman, P., O’Sullivan, M., and Frank, M. G. (1999). A few can catch a liar. Psychol.
Sci. 10, 263–266. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00147
Frank, M. G., and Ekman, P. (1997). The ability to detect deceit generalizes
across different types of high-stake lies. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 72, 1429–1439.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.72.6.1429
Freedberg, D., and Gallese, V. (2007). Motion, emotion and empathy in aesthetic
experience. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 197–203. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.02.003
Gallese, V. (2001). The ‘shared manifold’ hypothesis: from mirror neurons to
empathy. J. Conscious. Stud. 8, 33–50.
Gallese, V. (2003). The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest
for a common mechanism. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Biol. Sci. 358, 517–528.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2002.1234
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., and Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of
social cognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 396–403. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.002
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., and Prinz, W. (2001). The theory of
event coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning. Behav.
Brain Sci. 24, 849–878. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X01000103
Huys, R., Cañal-Bruland, R., Hagemann, N., Beek, P. J., Smeeton, N. J.,
and Williams, A. M. (2009). Global information pickup underpins
anticipation of tennis shot direction. J. Mot. Behav. 41, 158–170.
doi: 10.3200/JMBR.41.2.158-171
Jackson, R. C., Warren, S., and Abernethy, B. (2006). Anticipation skill
and susceptibility to deceptive movements. Acta Psychol. 123, 355–371.
doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.02.002
Johansson, G. (1973). Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its
analysis. Percept. Psychophys. 14, 201–211. doi: 10.3758/BF03212378
Johansson, G. (1976). Spatio-temporal differentiation and integration in visual
motion perception. Psychol. Rev. 38, 379–393. doi: 10.1007/bf00309043
Jokisch, D., Daum, I., and Troje, N. F. (2006). Self-recognition versus recognition
of others by biological motion: viewpoint-dependent effects. Perception 35,
911–920. doi: 10.1068/p5540
Keysers, C., and Gazzola, V. (2009). Expanding the mirror: vicarious activity
for actions, emotions and sensations. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 19, 1–6.
doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2009.10.006
Knoblich, G., and Flach, R. (2001). Predicting the effects of actions: interactions
of perception and action. Psychol. Sci. 12, 467–472. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.
00387
Kunde, W., Skirde, S., and Weigelt, M. (2011). Trust my face: cognitive factors of
head fakes in Sports. J. Exp. Psychol. Appl. 17, 110–127. doi: 10.1037/a0023756
Loula, F., Prasad, S., Harber, K., and Shiffrar, M. (2005). Recognizing people
from their movement. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 31, 210–220.
doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.210
Mann, D. L., Schaefers, T., and Cañal-Bruland, R. (2014). Action preferences and
the anticipation of action outcomes in penalty situations. Acta Psychol. (Amst).
152, 1–9. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.07.004
Mori, S., and Shimada, T. (2013). Expert anticipation from deceptive action.Attent.
Percept. Psychophys. 75, 751–770. doi: 10.3758/s13414-013-0435-z
Pollick, F. E., Kay, J. W., Heim, K., and Stringer, R. (2005). Gender recognition
from point-light walkers. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percep. Perform. 31, 1247–1265.
doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.31.6.1247
Prinz,W. (1997). Perception and action planning. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 9, 129–154.
doi: 10.1080/713752551
Renden, P., Kerstens, S., Oudejans, R. R. D., and Cañal-Bruland, R. (2014). Foul
or dive? Motor contributions to judging ambiguous foul situations in football.
Eur. J. Sport Sci. 14, S221–S227. doi: 10.1080/17461391.2012.683813
Rizzolatti, G., and Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci. 27, 169–192. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230
Runeson, S., and Frykholm, G. (1983). Kinematic specification of dynamics as
an informational basis for person-and-action perception: expectation, gender
recognition, and deceptive intention. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 112, 585–615.
doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.112.4.585
Schütz-Bosbach, S., and Prinz, W. (2007). Perceptual resonance: action-
induced modulation of perception. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 349–355.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.06.005
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., and Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: bodies and minds
moving together. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 70–76. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.009
Sebanz, N., and Shiffrar, M. (2009). Bluffing bodies: inferring intentions from
actions. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 16, 170–175. doi: 10.3758/PBR.16.1.170
Sevdalis, V., and Keller, P. E. (2012). Perceiving bodies in motion: expression
intensity, empathy, and experience. Exp. Brain Res. 222, 447–453.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-012-3229-y
Tomeo, E., Cesari, P., Aglioti, S. M., and Urgesi, C. (2012). Fooling
the kickers but not the goalkeepers: behavioural and neurophysiological
correlates of fake action detection in soccer. Cereb. Cortex 23, 2765–2778.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhs279
Vrij, A. (2004). Why professionals fail to catch liars and how they can improve.
Legal Crim. Psychol. 9, 159–181. doi: 10.1348/1355325041719356
Vrij, A. (2006). “Nonverbal communication and deception,” in The Sage Handbook
of Nonverbal Communication, eds V. Manusov and M. L. Patterson (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 341–359.
Williams, A. M., Huys, R., Cañal-Bruland, R., and Hagemann, N. (2009). The
dynamical information underpinning anticipation skill. Hum. Mov. Sci. 28,
362–370. doi: 10.1016/j.humov.2008.10.006
Wright, M. J., Bishop, D. T., Jackson, R. C., and Abernethy, B. (2013).
Brain regions concerned with the identification of deceptive soccer moves
by higher-skilled and lower-skilled players. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:851.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00851
Wright, M. J., and Jackson, R. C. (2014). Deceptive bodymovements reverse spatial
cueing in soccer. PLoS ONE 9:e104290. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0104290
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Cañal-Bruland. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 166
